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Book Reviews
Informative Surprises from the Law of the Church
of England
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: A CRITICAL
STUDY IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT. By Norman Doe.' Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. lxxiv, 543. $110.00.*
Reviewed by R.H. Helmholz*
Any reader accustomed to thinking of the Church of England as a
somewhat ramshackle institution, burdened with an organizational structure
inherited from the Middle Ages and a constitution fixed during the
sixteenth century, will find Norman Doe's The Legal Framework of the
Church of England an eye-opener. I did. A good many of the old forms
do still exist. For most purposes, however, the developments of the
twentieth century have superseded the inheritance of the past. And these
developments seem to have overwhelmed the old forms by their wide scope
and large number. The Legal Framework of the Church of England
describes today's law, with only occasional bows to history. It also
appropriately compares that modern law with the current canon law of the
Roman Catholic Church in England. Written by an author who modestly
describes himself as "an organist in the Church in Wales," 1 but who is
actually an accomplished scholar and a leader in the renewal of the study
of ecclesiastical law in the English Church,2 the book succeeds admirably.
This Review will take up three areas of the Church's law where the
book's conclusions proved surprising to me. It will then assess the
t Lecturer, Cardiff Law School, University of Wales.
* Hereinafter cited by page number only.
* Ruth Wyatt Rosenson Professor of Law, University of Chicago. LL.B. 1965, Harvard Law
School; Ph.D. 1970, University of California, Berkeley.
1. P. v. Leadership coming from the Welsh in this area is not unprecedented. See Dafydd
Jenkins, From Wales to Weltenburg?, in VOM MITTELALTERLICHEN RECHT ZUR NEUZEITLICHEN
RECHTSWIssENscHAFT:BEDINGUNGEN,WEGE UNDPROBLEMEDEREUROPAISCHENRECHTSGESCHICHTE
75 (Norbert Brieskorn et al. eds., 1994) (discussing marginalia from the Lichfield Gospels and suggest-
ing that "the use of sacred books for secular records could possibly have begun in Wales, and spread
from Wales to England and across half of Europe").
2. He is director of the LL.M. Program in Canon Law in the Cardiff Law School, and he is also
the author of an important historical work. See NORMAN DOE, FUNDAMENTAL AUTHORITY IN LATE
MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LAW (1990).
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readership the book should attract. A description of the book's coverage
must, however, come first. American readers may be hard pressed to see
why an account of the law of a Protestant church should require more than
five hundred pages of text and over three thousand footnotes. It does
though. The book is not too long. In fact, there is much more that could
be said, and some of the footnotes, if followed up, will lead readers to
some quite fascinating additional reading. The author's conclusion begins
by noting that "[tihe legal framework of the Church of England is
complex, "' and the contents of this work certainly bear out these words.
I. The Book's Coverage
The opening chapters provide a jurisprudential background. Broadly
speaking, the Church of England regards itself as being governed both by
divine law and human law. The former comes principally from biblical
sources, cannot be changed, and is the ultimate source of much of the
latter. An easily accessible example is marriage. The institution of
marriage is a part of divine law. Men and women have a right to marry.
The right to be married in the parish church where they live, however, is
a humanly enacted part of English ecclesiastical law.4 This right is
derived from divine law in one sense, but it would be no violation of
ecclesiastical law to move marriage ceremonies elsewhere or even to
restrict their celebration in church to those who adhere to the Church's
teaching.
Enacted canon law has the responsibility of helping "to enable the
church to fulfill its mission in the world."' This responsibility inevitably
gives canon law a special character when compared with more familiar sec-
ular law, and in this instance the law's goal is complicated by the
"establishment" of the English Church. The exact meaning of that term,
strange to an American ear except as something the Constitution forbids,6
proves elusive even for the book's author. He wrestles manfully with an
exact definition without ever being able to pin it down. At the very least,
however, establishment places some special duties on the Church. The
Queen's consent, which remains requisite for some forms of ecclesiastical
legislation,7 stands as an appropriate symbol of that relationship.
Understanding the exact scope and nature of ecclesiastical law is
further complicated by the existence of what the author calls "quasi-
3. P. 501.
4. See pp. 357-68 (chronicling the statutory and case-law development of the duty imposed upon
the English clergy to celebrate marriages).
5. P. 33.
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. See p. 9.
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legislation."' By this he means the type of diocesan regulations and codes
of practice that exist in profusion today. Lacking legislative or judicial
sanction, are these ubiquitous regulations nevertheless "law"? Most of us
would probably say that they are not. But if they are not, they nonetheless
function very much as many laws do. They direct conduct. Some account
of the "quasi-legislation" is therefore required even though it is difficult to
fit it into a fully satisfactory jurisprudential system.
The special nature of the Church's law is also illustrated, and is per-
haps most evident, in its "criminal" side.9 On the one hand, under canon-
ical principles any sanctions that exist must not be primarily punitive in
effect. Truly considered, the Church has only spiritual sanctions to impose
upon violators of its laws-typically exclusion from spiritual ministrations.
For non-adherents, exclusion will be no sanction at all. Even for adher-
ents, sanctions must serve to bring willing obedience to the Church's laws
rather than simply to punish or to "set an example" for others. The notion
of spiritual sanctions, therefore, seems distinctly unusual to observers
outside the system, and perhaps it may seem wrong to talk about sanctions
at all. On the other hand, something like them must exist if the goals of
the Church are to be advanced. At a minimum, church services cannot be
held without a modicum of order, and, in a broader sense, the Church will
not be respected if its own life lacks discipline. The canon law's task is to
secure that measure of order and discipline, without trespassing upon the
principle that the Church's law is meant to serve medicinal, not punitive,
purposes.
Part II of The Legal Framework of the Church of England moves from
theory to the instruments by which the Church's law is enacted and put into
effect. The chief legislative body is the General Synod. It is the
"Parliament of the Church," consisting of three Houses: the bishops and
representatives drawn both from the lower clergy and the laity.1" Below
it stand various executive and advisory bodies, ranging from the powerful
Church Commissioners to lowly parochial church councils. It makes a
long list. All have power to create and administer law in a lesser, but, in
the author's view, a nonetheless real sense.11 Finally, diocesan and pro-
vincial courts exercise jurisdiction chiefly over clergy discipline and what
are called faculty cases, matters that grow out of petitions to change the
8. P. 19.
9. See generally John E. Witte, Jr. & Thomas C. Arthur, The Three Uses of the Law: A Protestant
Source of the Purposes of Criminal Punishment?, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 433 (1993-1994) (focusing on
the interaction of Anglo-American criminal law and Protestant theological doctrine).
10. P. 56 (quoting Regina v. Ecclesiastical Committee of Both Houses of Parliament ex rel. The
Church Society, 6 Admin. L.R. 670 (1994)).
11. See pp. 78-79.
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fabric of churches and the uses made of other consecrated property.12
They do not, however, possess a general supervisory power over most of
the administrative and legislative bodies."
The three sections of Part III ("Ecclesiastical Ministry") take up the
legal responsibilities assigned to the bishops, the lower clergy, and the
laity. There are puzzles here. How, for example, should the ancient paro-
chial system and the law of patronage that accompanies it be integrated
with the regime of "church planting teams" now routinely appointed to
establish new "worship centres"? 4 Or what is the true meaning and
scope today of the "Oath of Canonical Obedience" taken by clergy about
to be ordained? 5 The author says what he can about these and other
recurrent problems, but sometimes he is obliged to conclude (as with the
second question) that the present arrangements "are badly drafted and in
need of revision."16
Part IV deals with faith and doctrine. Although it adopts an expansive
definition of those terms, even including liturgical regulations, this section
is the shortest (fifty-five pages) and least fully developed of The Legal
Framework of the Church of England. Perhaps this brevity reflects current
ambivalence about religious doctrine. What is one to make, for instance,
of this statement about religious liberty?:
The law of the Church of England neither claims nor presents a
compendium of fundamental human rights to practise the faith in
secular society, although rights deriving from the canons, as rights
under the law of the land, may be operative in the civil context as
well as the ecclesiastical. 17
The extent to which law controls liturgical observance also seemed a
trifle opaque to me. Much is made in this connection of a "principle of
liturgical subsidiarity,"18 and the author's view is that in this context the
rule of "uniformity has been replaced by that of conformity."19 I confess
I could not quite work out exactly what these expressions meant.
The sacraments and attendant rites are taken up in Part V. For
example, the minimum requirements for valid baptism are clearly set
forth,' and the ancient prohibition against re-baptism is restated in mod-
12. See generally pp. 142-45.
13. See pp. 84-87.
14. P. 410; see also p. 191.
15. P. 213.
16. P. 213.
17. P. 270.
18. E.g., pp. 288, 291, 308.
19. P. 308.
20. See pp. 321-22 (citing Kemp v. Wickes, 161 Eng. Rep. 1320, 1328 (Arches 1809) (holding
that the essential components of baptism are "the use of water and the invocation of the Holy Trinity"
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em form. Thus, requests for baptism by adults troubled by their lack of
response when baptized as infants "should always be refused."21 Further,
bringing up baptized children in a Christian household is declared to be a
duty incumbent upon all parents and sponsors.' The author thus suc-
cinctly lays out the basic place of baptism in the life of the Church. The
book continues apace through the Church's sacraments and rites until the
reader reaches the burial of the dead. Along the way, the author struggles
with the modern law of marriage and divorce-which he charitably
describes as "untidy."' A lack of coherence in its marriage law may be
inevitable. A certain amount of untidiness is one of the incidental char-
acteristics shared with the Catholic marriage law. It is a by-product of the
conflict between inherited ideals of marriage and twentieth-century notions
about the centrality of freedom in personal relationships.
Part VI deals with finance and ownership of property. Stresses and
strains have long been characteristic of this area of ecclesiastical law. On
one hand, bishops and other office holders in the Church have always been
the fiduciaries of a sort. The common law's trust has an ecclesiastical
parallel, if not indeed a canonical pedigree.' Bishops do not own the
Church's property, and the canon law has long prohibited them from alien-
ating it. 5 "Mortmain" laws, for example, had their origins in the vise-
like grip churches and monastic houses were thought to have fixed on prop-
erty that came under their control.' On the other hand, that prohibition
is a difficult rule to enforce to the letter. Some possessions wear out.
Some lose their appeal. It is impossible to administer an institution as
large as the Church without being able to sell any of its property at all.
The result in the Middle Ages was a series of what look very much like
compromises.27 Today, the situation remains similarly conflicted; it is
"regulated by a tangle of church-made and state-made law."2" It has also
raised new problems. For instance, does the duty not to alienate property
require insuring it?29 And must the Church provide legal aid out of its
patrimony when poor parishioners find their way into its courts or
in order to declare that a minister of the Anglican Church could not refuse to bury the child of
Calvinists)).
21. P. 325.
22. See pp. 325-27.
23. P. 384.
24. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1 238-39 (2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 1923) (1898).
25. See De rebus ecclesiae alienandis, vel non, X 3.13.1-.12.
26. See, e.g., SANDRA RABAN, MORTMAIN LEGISLATION AND THE ENGLISH CHURCH, 1279-1500,
at 3 (1982).
27. See, e.g., Glossa ordinaria, X 3.13.5, rubr. ("Nota quod nullus debet alienare res ecclesiae
immobiles, et est sententda generalis; fallit enhn in casu udlitads.").
28. P. 439.
29. See pp. 487-89.
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administrative tribunals' One of the merits of this book is that it raises
and addresses such questions honestly.
II. The Book's Surprises
A number of my assumptions about the Church of England were over-
turned by reading this book. Several of my notions about its character turn
out to have been, to put it mildly, very much out of date. Not that they
were wholly mistaken. In each instance, there was something to be said
for my earlier assumptions. Overall, however, they provided an entirely
inadequate picture of the situation today. Because other readers may share
my assumptions (and my ignorance), describing three of the surprises that
awaited me in The Legal Framework of the Church of England may be
something more than simply a penitential exercise.31
A. The Church's Antiquated Institutions
One of my assumptions was that the largest part of the government of
the English Church continued to move along the path laid out by its medi-
eval inheritance. Apart from the abolition of papal jurisdiction, the
Reformation had little immediate impact on the law and institutions of the
English Church.32 The bishoprics were left in place; the convocations of
the provinces of Canterbury and York continued to exist; churchwardens
remained as the superintendents of parish churches; and the ecclesiastical
courts exercised a jurisdiction little changed from what it had been in
1500. I thought that most of what had happened since then consisted of
the gradual loss of many parts of this heritage, principally during the
nineteenth century. Otherwise, I thought, the Church's institutions had
remained pretty much the same.'
I might have been right in 1600. Not today. The provincial convoca-
tions do still exist, for example, but their legislative functions were largely
30. Seep. 499.
31. I can claim some good company, at least in the general sense of not obstinately adhering to
fixed ideas. See Thomas L. Shaffer, How I Changed My Mind, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 291, 301 (1993-
1994).
32. See FELIX MAKOWER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH
OF ENGLAND 48-68 (Burt Frankin 1971) (1895) (describing the deferential treatment given established
constitutional and jurisdictional doctrines by reformers).
33. See ERIC JOSEF CARLSON, MARRIAGE AND THE ENGLISH REFORMATION 81 (1994); DOROTHY
M. OWEN, THE MEDIEVAL CANON LAW: TEACHING, LITERATURE AND TRANSMISSION 43 (1990);
Christopher Kitching, The Prerogative Court of Canterbury from Warham to Whitgift, in CONTINUITY
AND CHANGE: PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE CHURCH IN ENGLAND 1500-1642, at 191,
191-93 (Rosemary O'Day & Felicity Heal eds., 1976) ("[[In this sphere of church administration one
is struck rather by the continuity than by the change.").
34. A good guide to the nature of litigation heard by the London courts during the last years when
they held to something like their earlier jurisdiction is provided by S.M. WADDAMS, LAW, POLITICS
AND THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: THE CAREER OF STEPHEN LUSHINGTON 1782-1873, at 160-93 (1992).
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removed in 1919, and today they have been transferred to the General
Synod." Churchwardens, too, survive, but most local decisions once
within their domain are now taken over by a newer institution, the paro-
chial church council. 6 Many legal matters that once were left to the
English consistory courts have similarly been moved elsewhere within the
Church's administrative machinery.37 Of the list just given, only the bish-
ops have escaped formally untouched, although, of course, there have been
many changes in their status and responsibilities. Indeed, their involve-
ment with legal matters has in some sense intensified. 8
Reminders of the past are to be found here and there in the pages of
this book. It is apparently still the law, for instance, that a clergyman who
actively farms an area larger than eighty acres without the permission of
his bishop may be fined two pounds per annum.39 But such provisions
look more and more out of place in the law of today; many are simply
charming reminders of the past. A few do remain significant, however.
For instance, the ancient system of patronage still exists.4 Unlike mod-
ern Catholic practice, under which most pastors are episcopal appointees,
the Church of England retains a version of the medieval ius patronatus.4t
Patrons, who may be laymen or corporate bodies, possess the right to nom-
inate a cleric to a particular ecclesiastical benefice or office. This right is
called an advowson in common-law terminology. The bishop's role is a
largely supervisory and administrative one; he may refuse to admit the per-
son presented if there are canonical grounds for it, such as simony or
insufficient learning. Otherwise, he must proceed.42
Although this ancient system has not been abolished, today it has come
under the Pastoral Measure of 1983 and the Patronage (Benefices) Measure
of 1986, which have overlaid the system with a variety of additions, some
large, some small. For example, with the consent of the diocesan pastoral
committee, the bishop may now suspend the right of patronage for up to
five years. 3 There may also be problems of integration with the modern
35. See pp. 60-67, 72.
36. See pp. 106-07.
37. See, e.g., p. 143 (noting that the diocesan chancellor can bypass the consistory courts by dele-
gating judicial powers to the archdeacon for unopposed faculty petitions (citing Care of Churches and
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure, 1991, No. 1, § 14 (Eng.))).
38. See, e.g., p. 143 (noting that bishops may now hear faculty petition cases alone in certain qual-
ified situations (citing Ecclesiastical Jurisdictional Measure, 1963, No. 1, § 46(1) (Eng.))).
39. See p. 201 & n.138 (citing Pluralities Act, 1838, 1 &2 Vict., ch. 106, §§ 28, 117 (Eng.)).
40. See pp. 191-92.
41. The basic work on the canon law is PETER LANDAU, JUS PATRONATUS: STUDIEN ZUR
ENTWICKLUNG DES PATRONATS IM DEKRETALENRECHT UND DER KANONISTIK DES 12. UND 13.
JAHRHUNDERTS (1975).
42. See pp. 190-93.
43. See p. 192; Pastoral Measure, 1983, No. 1, § 67(1) (Eng.). The right of suspension was first
made available to the bishop by passage of the Benefices (Suspension of Presentation) Measure, 1946,
No. 3, § I(1) (Eng.).
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"team ministries," whereby several parishes are effectively combined for
pastoral purposes. The parochial church council must advise and consent
to the patron's choice in any case.' Although the old form has in this
instance been retained, the reality looks new.
B. Secular Control of the Church
It is not an altogether unnatural assumption that because it is estab-
lished, the Church of England is under the thumb of the State. The
English Reformation was imposed upon the Church by a strong-willed
monarch, the argument runs, and it was carried through by an act of
Parliament. The historical evolution of the English Church must have
resulted in subservience to secular interests. True, some of the strongest
statements of that assessment come from the pens of Catholic detractors of
the Church of England. 5 But it had seemed to me that they were guilty
only of exaggerating a valid point. There have, of course, always been
English men and women ready to assert the rights of the spiritual against
the temporal powers.' But the reality, in my view, was that a secular
power, the Parliament, called the tune to which the English clergy danced.
The Legal Framework of the Church of England shows quite convinc-
ingly that this view does not do justice to the modern situation, especially
as a matter of ordinary practice. Another author on the subject has
recently entitled his own treatment of the Church's constitutional powers
"Towards Autonomy,"47 and The Legal Framework of the Church of
England's account dovetails nicely with that characterization. Unlike the
rules passed by the pre-1919 convocations, measures enacted by the
General Synod ordinarily "enjoy the same authority as parliamentary
statutes."4  Because a good deal of the machinery used in regulating the
clergy and administering the Church's patrimony rests upon Synodal enact-
ment, most questions are insulated from judicial review. The process of
enactment, however, is complicated. Synodal enactments are passed
through a committee of the Houses of Parliament and then Parliament
itself, and they ultimately receive the royal assent. 9 But Parliament has
no power to amend, so that it is an assembly of the Church that
44. See pp. 196-97.
45. See, e.g., J.J. SCARISBRICK, THE REFORMATION AND THE ENGLISH PEOPLE 61-62 (1984).
46. See, e.g., WILLIAM WAKE, THE STATE OF THE CHURCH AND CLERGY OF ENGLAND 86
(London, R. Sarer 1703) (stating that in cases of "extremity" the "bishops and other pastors" had the
responsibility to "run any danger" to assert the rights of the Church against the secular powers). Wake
was the archbishop of Canterbury from 1716 until his death in 1737.
47. MARK HILL, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 19 (1995).
48. P. 73.
49. See pp. 63-66.
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legislates.' The legislative output has indeed been considerable. The
result is that, like many of the modem changes, this one has the look of a
half-way station. Parliament still has a role, but now a more minor one,
in the ordinary process of legislation for the Church.
Most writers on the subject, including the author, seem to have
assumed that this move towards autonomy is a healthy development.5 '
Surprisingly, it is a thoughtful Roman Catholic observer, Robert Rodes,
who has his doubts. 2 Autonomy for the Church in the modern world
inevitably means the privatization of religion, and the established character
of the English Church has been a bulwark against the exclusion of religion
from the life of a nation. "[A]I1 Christendom," Rodes wrote, "has much
to learn from the experience of the English nation and the English national
church."I Inclusion of the laity in the making of ecclesiastical
legislation, permitted under the new measures and one of the clearest points
of contrast with the tenets of Catholic canon law,4 thus expresses a
valuable part of the English heritage. In this view, it is not equivalent to
secular control over the Church.
C. The Eclipse of Ecclesiastical Law
Although the existence of several other recent books dealing with
English ecclesiastical law might have given me pause,55 I was of the opin-
ion that law had come to play a much diminished role in the Church of
England. The ecclesiastical courts continue to sit, but a series of
nineteenth-century changes greatly depleted their subject-matter
competence. Jurisdiction over marriage and divorce and testamentary mat-
ters was taken away from them at that time. Doctors' Commons, the
center of civilian learning in London, was wound up in 1865; its library
was dispersed soon afterwards.56  Apart from jurisdiction over facul-
50. See p. 65.
51. See p. 505 ("Ecclesiastical autonomy involves the ability of the church to fulfil its
mission .... ."); see also David Say, Towards 2000: Church and State Relations, 2 ECCLESIASTICAL
L.J. 152, 153-54 (1991) (discussing the Enabling Act of 1919, which instilled in the Church a large
measure of self-government).
52. See ROBERT E. RODES, JR., LAW AND MODERNIZATION IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND:
CHARLES n1 TO THE WELFARE STATE 373 (1991). Another Catholic observer takes much the same
position. See ADRIAN HASTINGS, CHURCH AND STATE: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE 63 (1991).
53. RODES, supra note 52, at 373.
54. See p. 57. Compare Synodical Government Measure, 1969, No. 2, sched. 2, art. I (Eng.)
(denoting the House of Laity as one of the entities composing the General Synod), with 1983 CODE
c.129 (providing no power of jurisdiction to lay members of the Roman Catholic faithful).
55. See TIMOTHY BRIDEN & BRIAN HANSON, MOORE'S INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH CANON LAW
(3d ed. 1992); RUPERT D.H. BURSELL, LITURGY, ORDER AND THE LAW (1996); WILLIAM DALE, THE
LAW OF THE PARISH CHURCH (6th ed. 1989); HILL, supra note 47.
56. See G.D. SQUIBB, DOCTORS' COMMONS 102-09 (1977) (describing the process of closing
down the institution).
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ties,57 not much seemed left. Given the widespread modern sentiment that
coercive regulation is incompatible with the Gospels, a sentiment that is
bound to diminish the place of the traditional courts, the conclusion that
law had somehow been eclipsed seemed inescapable.
This conclusion proves to be much too "court-centered" a view of the
matter. In the first place, there is more legislation and "quasi-legislation"
than ever. And although it is true that the consistory courts themselves
have been "marginalized" for most purposes,58 this has not caused any
lessening in the amount of law, or even the number of legal disputes. It
has simply caused their transfer either to what the author calls "new model
adjudicative tribunals," or to other administrative bodies. 9 Proponents
of alternative dispute resolution in the United States will note with pleasure
that something like the same discontent they feel towards formal legal proc-
ess exists in the Church of England. It has led to a shift towards informal-
ity in the settlement of disputes and a greater need for consultation with
interested parties at every turn.' It has not meant less law.
At least to an outsider, the resulting situation appears to leave some-
thing to be desired. In discarding the possibility of litigation for most pur-
poses, the English Church has put into place an extensive system of
required consultation.61 Throughout the book's descriptions, one reads
of a "duty to consult,"62 a "duty to consider,"' or some variant of these
phrases.'M In order to take any action regarding a cathedral, for example,
there must first be a "draft scheme" prepared by the Cathedral Statutes
Commission, and the Commission must submit it not only to the bishop
and the Church commissioners, but also "so far as is practicable, [to] every
other person who appears to the Commission to be affected."' Even
then, there is additional room for appeal and argument by those who dislike
the results of this consultation, although along what precise lines is not
57. This is, of course, a continuing source of cases brought before the consistory courts. See
generally G.H. NEWSOM & G.L. NEWSOM, FACULTY JURISDICTION OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND (2d
ed. 1993).
58. P. 130.
59. P. 140.
60. See, e.g., pp. 135-39 (discussing the procedure for reconciling serious breakdowns in the pas-
toral relationship by recourse to preliminary hearings, interviews, and appointments of conciliators,
among other measures).
61. See p. 78 (describing the system as "The Consultation Model").
62. E.g., pp. 43, 79, 305.
63. P. 448.
64. See, e.g., p. 116 (describing the diocesan synod's duty to keep informed of parish activity
when delegating diocese functions to a deanery synod); pp. 319, 318-19 (describing a minister's "duty
to seek the goodwill" of a parent's home minister when baptizing a child from the home minister's
parish); p. 467 (detailing the Board of Governors's duty to report on finances to the Church
Commissioners).
65. P. 80 (quoting Cathedrals Measure, 1976, No. 1, § 2(2)(c) (Eng.)).'
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wholly clear.' Like the National Environmental Policy Act in the United
States,67 more faith seems to have been placed in reasoned consultation
than the process will reasonably bear.68 I could not help imagining that
cathedral commissioners, anxious to get on with their plans, must yearn for
the days of Barchester Towers, and on some days perhaps even for those
of Thomas Becket.
III. Potential Readers
The principal readership of The Legal Framework of the Church of
England will undoubtedly be lawyers and administrators within the Church
of England. It will provide them with food for thought, as well as useful
information about the legal problems they encounter. Here and there it
may provoke disagreement. But is there anyone else to whom the book
should appeal? Particularly for American readers, the answer to that ques-
tion is not obvious. I think, however, there are at least four kinds of
readers who will profit from perusing parts, if not all, of the book.
A. Students of Comparative Law and Jurisprudence
Understanding the nature of different legal systems and coming to
grips with the different possibilities inherent in all legal structures are two
reasons for comparative lawyers to have a look at The Legal Framework
of the Church of England. The rules and concepts described in the book
are not so far removed from contemporary secular law as to be unrecogniz-
able, but neither are they identical. For this reason alone, they are well
worth comparing. The process may even be fruitful. For instance, the
kinds of sanctions available to the canon law are well worth understanding
for the light they shed on the possibilities available to all legal systems.
Indeed, something like this body of sanctions seems to be enjoying a cer-
tain vogue in American law today.69 Discontent with money damages in
civil suits and with imprisonment in criminal matters has caused observers
to look further afield. They will find plenty in this book worth exploring.
The concept of "public scandal" and the consequences that follow
from it under the law of the Church will also make particularly interesting
66. A similar example is provided by "church planting," that is, the creation of a new church or
parish. It requires "full consultation" with the archdeacon, the rural dean, several pastoral committees,
the archdeaconry's ecumenical officer, the diocesan adviser on evangelism, leaders of other denomina-
tions, representatives of other local parishes, and "civic, local, and community leaders and groups."
P. 410. Would a generous benefactor not find this process of endless consultation discouraging?
67. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994).
68. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 549-55 (1978) (rejecting the contention that the National Environmental Policy Act requires
hearings on every alternative before the grant of a nuclear power operating license).
69. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591,
631 (1996) (advocating the use of shaming practices as criminal sanctions).
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reading for many. To what extent do legal systems treat the same acts
differently when they do (or do not) cause adverse reaction among those
who are subject to the law? Most legal systems face this question. The
law of nuisance is full of examples.7' The most topical (and controver-
sial) example found in these pages concerns the ordination of women,
which has recently become the rule.71 In the Church of England, how-
ever, any parochial church council can prevent an ordained woman from
celebrating the Holy Communion in their parish church.' The bishop has
no right to veto their resolution to that effect.7 How long this "opt-out"
provision will last is anyone's guess, but presumably it will not exist any
longer than the possibility that "public scandal" should be generated by the
presence of women in holy orders continues to exist.
B. Students of Legal History
Among legal historians, the past fifteen years have witnessed a grow-
ing attention to the law of the Church. Part of this ascendance is doubtless
attributable to the appearance and success of Harold Berman's Law and
Revolution.74 Berman located the start of the Western legal tradition in
the "papal revolution" of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and he
described the law of the Church as the first modern legal system.75 The
canon law's influence over the course of historical development has been
considerable.76 It seems entirely natural that legal historians who have
shared in this increased interest in the subject will wish to know how things
have worked out.
Not that The Legal Framework of the Church of England is about his-
tory. Its gaze is fixed steadily on the present. Still, legal historians will
find echoes of the past here, such as a modern example of the medieval
principle that the ecclesiastical courts had the right to "invoke the secular
70. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (defining nui-
sance as "a right thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor").
71. See pp. 188-90.
72. See p. 337 (citing Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure, 1993; No. 2, § 3(1) (Eng.)
(allowing parochial church councils to pass a resolution preventing women from presiding at
Communion or pronouncing Absolution)).
73. See p. 337; Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure, 1993, No. 2, § 5(b) (Eng.) (declaring
any act by a bishop, priest, or deacon in contravention of a resolution passed pursuant to § 3(1) to be
a violation of ecclesiastical law).
74. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION (1983). The success of REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION (1990), must also have contributed to this change, although
its primary focus is not placed on the law of the Church.
75. BERMAN, supra note 74, at 2.
76. See FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE 47-54 (Tony Weir trans.,
1995).
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arm" in order to enforce their sentences,' or the modern equivalent to the
ancient requirement that any person be ordained to a specific "title" in the
Church." It may even be true that historians have something to
contribute. The question of the extent to which custom remains a source
of law, as it was in earlier centuries, presents one such tantalizing
possibility. The book raises this question, but necessarily somewhat
inconclusively. 9 More thought about the subject seems appropriate, for
there are several areas of the law where it might usefully come into
play-as in, for example, defining the status of assistant bishops.'" The
connected principle of the desuetude of law,"1 mentioned here pointedly
in connection with the duty of candidates for confirmation to recite the Ten
Commandments,' might also usefully be addressed by ecclesiastical his-
torians with some knowledge of the history of the subject.
C. Modern Catholic Canonists
The book's comparison of the law of the Church of England with the
canon law of the Roman Catholic Church, although pursued with energy
and consistency, struck me as only occasionally illuminating. There was
not enough space at the author's disposal to go into the subject in any
depth, and I was not convinced that the necessarily superficial treatment
added real value.' It seemed particularly doubtful that Catholic canon
law could be understood without examining practice at the Roman curia.
The author justified the decision to make the comparison in part by saying
that both systems ultimately derive from the same source." That is true
in a sense, of course, but in fact the two systems have pretty much gone
77. See, e.g., pp. 457-58 (describing a bishop's right to call upon the county court to secure deliv-
ery of registers or records to the diocesan records office in the event the bishop's order to deposit such
records was not complied with). The theory of the medieval canon law that supported the right to
invoke secular aid is described in R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAw 350-57
(1996); its effect in practice is described in F. DONALD LOGAN, EXCOMMUNICATION AND THE
SECULAR ARM IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (1968).
78. See p. 490 (noting that in ordinary circumstances a bishop cannot ordain someone unless that
person has a post which entities him to remuneration); D.70 c.2 ("Irrita sit ordinatio sine tiudo
facta.").
79. See pp. 86-87.
80. See p. 162 (stating that "[a]n ecclesiastical practice has developed" to define the role of assist-
ant bishops in helping the diocesan bishop).
81. See GUIDO CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 16-30 (1982) (discussing
the principle of desuetude).
82. See p. 330 (listing the ability to recite the Ten Commandments as one of the prerequisites for
confirmation that is no longer observed in practice).
83. My view may not be widely shared, however. See, e.g., Jobe Abbass, Offices in the Church:
A Comparative Study of the Eastern andLatin Codes of Canon Law, in LIBER AMiCORUM MONS. BIFFI:
SCRrTTI IN ONORE DI MONS. FRANCO BIFFI 211 (J. Andrds Gutigrrez ed., 1994).
84. See p. 501 ("The [canon law] is in more ways than one the parent of the [law of the Church
of England]").
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their own ways. Both have moved away from the medieval ius commune.
The Roman Church's model (since 1918) is the Continental code. English
ecclesiastical law, by contrast, is to be discovered from a "sea of single
instances."' It is "scattered ... throughout the canons, synodical and
parliamentary legislation, and judicial decisions."6 Neither seems con-
nected organically with the medieval law.'
I do not mean, however, that Catholic canonists will find little of
interest in The Legal Framework of the Church of England. To the con-
trary, it should whet their appetites. The English Church's approach to the
law of marriage and divorce, which furnishes the largest component of the
business of Catholic tribunals, should interest them if only for its resolute
refusal to treat the subject as one appropriate for litigation.8 They will
be intrigued to read that their own Church is "established in a loose sense"
in England.89 And "liturgical ecumenism," the holding of joint or shared
religious services, may indeed require them to take some account of the
Church of England's rules.'o If there is to be broader progress in ecu-
menism, some "growing together" in law is probably required. This book
will facilitate that process.
D. Protestant Clergy
I cannot say what the reaction of most of the clergy of mainstream
Protestant denominations will be if they choose to peruse the pages of The
Legal Framework of the Church of England. Perhaps it may be horror at
the detail. An effort might nonetheless be made by some of them with
profit. At the very least, it will require them to think about an important
question. A common view holds that there is a fundamental opposition
between ecclesiastical law and the true nature of religious life.91 It is the
spirit, not the letter of the law, that gives life. This view is strong enough
that it sometimes seems to be accepted today as a matter of course.92
85. P. 504.
86. P. 172.
87. See MANLIO BELLOMO, THE COMMON LEGAL PAST OF EUROPE 74 (Lydia G. Cochrane
trans., 1995) (finding the "new constitutional structure of the Holy Roman Empire" to have little in
common with the Justinian roots of the ius commune).
88. See p. 357.
89. P. 11 (describing the "loose" establishment of the Catholic Church in England as a result of
its recognition by both common law and parliamentary statute).
90. See pp. 302-06 (discussing the right of bishops of the Church of England to authorize non-
Anglicans to use Church facilities or to conduct shared services).
91. See p. 33 & nn.2-3 (quoting 298 PARL. DEE., H.L. (5th ser.) 1295, 1297 (1969) (statement
of Lord Brooke of Cumnor) ("[S]ometimes laymen like myself are appalled at the extent to which the
original work of Christianity has become overlaid with legal structure.") and citing RUDOLPH SOHM,
KIRCHENRECHT (1892), for Sohm's view that law and the idea of "the church as a community bound
together by love" are antithetical).
92. See pp. 33-34.
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Moreover, the perception that most American ministers of the Gospel bring
to the table is that law consists of a series of commands forbidding certain
conduct and punishing those who commit it.' The law of the Western
Church seems at first sight to fit that perception perfectly. Its heritage is
the rack and the auto daft.9
This book challenges this widespread view. It presents ecclesiastical
law not simply (or even mainly) as a means to forbid and punish. The
law's true role is rather to facilitate the ends for which the Church exists.
For instance, the ministry of bishops is one that is "ordered and facilitated
by law."95 The law exists to enable bishops to carry out their functions
properly, not to tie their hands or to require them to turn their backs on the
Gospels. In the author's view, the ready invocation of equity, the possibil-
ity of dispensation, and the special nature of ecclesiastical sanctions are all
recognitions of this special character of ecclesiastical law.
There does seem to be something to this argument. Pastors need
guides to right action. We all do. It is not always easy to be sure how to
act, and it is often tempting to follow a private vision and sometimes a pri-
vate interest. We make mistakes thereby. The problem is particularly
acute for the clergy when someone else is seeking advice or permission to
do something which, although desired, will hurt that person in the end.
Following the law can provide support for taking the tougher road. It may
even be useful to know that sanctions exist if the law is flouted. I think
this is something like what the author means when he speaks of the law as
"facilitating" the purposes for which the Church exists. Within its sphere,
such "facilitation" is what the law, which The Legal Framework of the
Church of England so painstakingly describes, seeks actually to achieve.
IV. Conclusion
For several kinds of readers, therefore, The Legal Framework of the
Church of England is well worth consulting. It is more than a sign of the
renewal of interest in ecclesiastical law in England, though it is surely also
that. The book is a "thought inducing" work. Perusing it may upset long-
held and apparently self-evident views, as it has upset some of mine. That
93. See, for example, the section devoted to law in a comprehensiveguide to American religion,
2 A CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 582-600 (Nelson Burr ed., 1961) (mentioning
law only in the sense of the constitutional separation of church and state). See also Harold J. Berman,
Law and Theology, in THE WESTMINSTER DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 322, 323 (Alan
Richardson & John Bowden eds., 1983) ("Thus far, social theology .. . has had little that is
constructive to say about the processes of law.").
94. See R.I. MOORE, THE FORMATION OF A PERSECUTING SOCIETY: POWER AND DEVIANCE IN
WESTERN EUROPE, 950-1250, at 132 (1987); EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 49, 54-62 (1985); 2
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 24, at 657-58.
95. P. 161.
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is one of its values. The process leads on to further questions, again not
limited to matters of a strictly ecclesiastical nature. For this, I am grateful
to the author's efforts in writing this excellent account. The book (and the
law it describes) contain many informative surprises.
